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Abstract
This Article will examine the problem of the standing of private litigants by putting the action
for annulment in its context. It will describe briefly how the Treaty of Rome set up a complex
system in which the acts of the EC Institutions could be reviewed, a task that is shared between
the European Courts and the courts of the Member States. It will also describe briefly the different
correctives introduced by the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance to the system as
initially envisaged. It will be seen that a good deal of flexibility has been introduced into the
position of private litigants.
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INTRODUCTION
The establishment of the Court of First Instance over which
Judge Vesterdorf has presided since March 4, 1998 has greatly
enhanced the judicial protection of litigants in the European
Community legal order. Visitors and parties appearing for the
first time are almost always impressed by how carefully the Court
of First Instance goes about its business and how far removed its
approach is from that of continental administrative jurisdictions.
A glance at its closely reasoned judgments shows how sys-
tematically the Court of First Instance examines the pleas of the
parties: their submissions are dissected and answered in tightly
reasoned judgments. The consequence is that the judgments
can be long. One judgment even ran to a thousand pages.' One
might also attend a hearing of the Court and listen to the cross
examination of counsel by the members of the bench. The
counsel for each party is given about fifteen to twenty minutes to
make submissions orally, usually uninterrupted. Then, once the
prepared oral submissions are over, the questions from the
bench rain down: pleas are tested, facts are questioned, docu-
ments on the Court's file are examined. Those sessions are ex-
haustive and often exhausting, and the hearings in complex
cases can sometimes last several days. The hearing in the
Microsoft case lasted an entire week.2 Each case is conducted in
* Barrister, Legal Service, European Commission. Special thanks to Professor
Francesca Bignami. Thanks also to Paul Bury, Laurent Forestier, Luigi Malferrari,
Imola Streho, Lemonia Tsaroucha and Hubert van Vliet. All errors and infelicities are
mine alone. All views and opinions are purely personal and should not be attributed to
the European Commission.
1. See Cimenteries CBR v. Commission, Joined Cases T-25, T-26, T-30-32, T-34-39,
T-42-46, T-48, T-50-65, T-68-71, T-87, T-88, T-103, T-104/95, [2000] E.C.R. I1-491 (deal-
ing with a cement cartel).
2. See Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T-201/04 (case pending). The hearing
in this case lasted from April 24 to April 28, 2006.
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a way to enhance the judicial protection of the litigants. Thus,
the Court of First Instance amply carries out its mission as as-
signed to it by the Council Decision that set it up.3 The fourth
recital of that Decision states: "[I]n respect of actions requiring
close examination of complex facts, the establishment of a sec-
ond court will improve the judicial protection of individual inter-
ests."
4
There is one area, however, in which the Court of First In-
stance tried and did not succeed to bring about a change that
many believe would have improved the judicial protection of in-
dividuals-the rules on standing of private litigants to seek the
annulment under Article 230, section 4 of the Treaty Establish-
ing the European Community ("EC Treaty") of acts of the Insti-
tutions of which they are not the addressees.5 As will be seen,
those rules are regarded as restrictive of standing: only a private
litigant who can show that she has some unique characteristic or
is in a unique position-is "directly and individually concerned"
according to the terminology employed-can sue. All other pri-
vate litigants must endeavor to seek redress in the courts of the
Member States. Those restrictive rules on standing have been
much criticized not only by academic writers and practitioners
but also by several Advocates General of the European Court of
Justice.
In 2002, the Court of First Instance tried to re-interpret the
rules on standing of private litigants-seeking to challenge a
measure which is not addressed to them and which is of general
application-in a more liberal manner. But its judgment was
overturned by the Court of Justice.
Consequently, this Article will try to answer the following
questions: why the changes proposed by the Court of First In-
stance were rejected by the Court of Justice; whether they really
do constitute a missed opportunity to improve the judicial pro-
tection of individuals; and whether those changes are even nec-
essary. Moreover, the problem of access to the courts by private
plaintiffs has to be seen in the light of the evolving and increas-
ingly liberal standards of standing. As Anthony Arnull puts it
3. See Council Decision No. 88/591/ECSC, O.J. L 319/1 (1988).
4. Id. at 1.
5. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
Dec. 29, 2006, O.J. C 321 E/37 (2006) [hereinafter EC Treaty].
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pithily: "[W]hat may have been appropriate in the 1960s and
1970s is no longer so at the beginning of the new millennium. 6
Many jurisdictions in the Member States and elsewhere impose
relatively strict requirements on private plaintiffs who seek to
have measures of general application reviewed by a court. In
Europe, those strict requirements have come under scrutiny by
the European Court of Human Rights to see if they comply with
Article 6, Section 1 of the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.7 Indeed, the
European Court of Human Rights held in Posti & Rahko v. Fin-
land that the inability to challenge before a court of law a mea-
sure of general application that affected a "civil right" of the
plaintiff constituted a breach of Article 6, Section 1 of that Con-
vention."
Issues of standing of private plaintiffs take on an added di-
mension in EC law. Not only must the question of whether a pri-
vate plaintiff should have standing be asked but also the ques-
tions of where and when standing should be granted. Although
the where and the when are connected in reality, it is proposed to
concentrate on where a private party should bring an action for
judicial review. When an action should be brought raises fasci-
nating questions, but those are better dealt with separately.
This Article will examine the problem of the standing of pri-
vate litigants by putting the action for annulment in its context.
It will describe briefly how the Treaty of Rome set up a complex
system in which the acts of the EC Institutions could be re-
viewed, a task that is shared between the European Courts and
the courts of the Member States.
It will also describe briefly the different correctives intro-
duced by the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance to
the system as initially envisaged. It will be seen that a good deal
of flexibility has been introduced into the position of private liti-
gants.
6. Anthony Arnull, The Action for Annulment: A Case of Double Standards?, in JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW 177, 189 (David O'Keefe ed., 2000).
7. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 6, § 1, Nov. 4, 1950 [hereinafter European Convention on Human
Rights] ("In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... , everyone is enti-
tled to a fair and public hearing.., by an independent and impartial tribunal estab-
lished by law.").
8. Posti & Rahko v. Finland, 27824 Eur. Ct. H.R. 95, 66 (2002).
STANDING OF PRVATE PLAINTIFFS
Nevertheless, many consider the rules on the standing of
individuals too restrictive and the alternative route of redress via
the courts of Member States as inadequate. The Court of First
Instance was unsuccessful in its attempt to broaden the standing
of individuals. Its judgment liberalizing the rule on standing was
quashed by the Court of Justice. But the matter did not end
there. The Court ofJustice has since shown in a tantalizing man-
ner how the existing system can be improved to provide better
judicial protection of private plaintiffs. Although the draft Con-
stitution would have made certain changes to the rules on stand-
ing, those changes were not as sweeping as some would have
hoped. Throughout the story, the Court of Justice showed its
attachment to a system of redress for private plaintiffs through
the courts of the Member States.
I. THE DEFAULT SYSTEM FOR PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS
The requirement ofjudicial control is a general principle of
EC law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to
the Member States and enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.9 It is also laid down by Article 47(1) of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union pro-
claimed on December 7, 2000.1" The EC Treaty set up a unique
system for reviewing the acts of the EC Institutions. It is a system
that has two routes: the first is a direct route, which is reserved
to a category of plaintiffs known as "privileged applicants" or
"privileged plaintiffs" and leads to the Court ofJustice and to the
Court of First Instance directly; the second is indirect and is used
by "non-privileged applicants"-in reality, private plaintiffs" -
9. See Ministero delle Finanze v. Eribrand, Case C-467/01, [2003] E.C.R. 1-6471,
61; Marguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Case 222/
84, [1986] E.C.R. 1651, 1 18-19; see also Unibet (London) Ltd. & Unibet (Int'l) Ltd. v.
Justitiekanslern, Case C-432/05 (ECJ Mar. 13, 2007) (not yet reported), 37
("[Aiccording to settled case law, the principle of effective judicial protection is a gen-
eral principle of Community law stemming from the constitutional traditions common
to Member States, which has been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights ad Fundamental Freedoms.").
10. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 18, 2000, O.J. C
364/1, at 1 (2000).
11. "Private plaintiff" means, for the purpose of Article 230, Section 4, all persons
who are not Institutions or Member States coming within the ambit of Article 230,
Sections 2 or 3. Thus bodies of the Member States governed by public law and which
have legal personality, such as regional authorities, are persons within the meaning of
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and leads to the Court of Justice indirectly, via the courts of the
Member States. The combination of the two routes led the
Court of Justice to conclude that "every person has, or will have
the opportunity to challenge a Community measure which forms
the basis of a decision adversely affecting him."1 This two tier
system is but a manifestation of the symbiotic relationship be-
tween EC law and the legal systems of the Member States, as
clearly stated by the Court of Justice in Administrazione delle
Finanze v. Simmenthal. 13 In this case, the Court ofJustice charac-
terized the role of national courts as that of "an organ of a Mem-
ber State [whose task it is] to protect, in a case within its jurisdic-
tion, the rights conferred upon individuals by Community
law."1 4 The use of one route or the other rests on the distinction
between privileged and non-privileged applicants.
A. The Distinction Between Privileged and Non-pivileged Applicants
Article 230 of the EC Treaty is the provision that grants the
Court ofJustice, and now the Court of First Instance,jurisdiction
to review the legality of acts of the Institutions upon being seized
of an action for annulment.
Article 230 treats institutional plaintiffs, known as privileged
applicants, differently from private plaintiffs. Article 230, Section
2 permits actions brought by Member States, the European Par-
liament, the Council or the Commission without requiring those
plaintiffs to fulfill any condition of standing. Consequently, Arti-
cle 230, Section 2 grants institutional plaintiffs a general right to
bring an action for annulment. In between the privileged appli-
cants and the private plaintiffs are the Court of Auditors and the
European Central Bank-semi-privileged applicants-which, ac-
cording to Article 230, Section 3 must show that the action they
bring is for "the purpose of protecting their prerogatives."15
Private plaintiffs have only a limited right of access to the
European courts. They can only bring an action for annulment
Article 230, Section 4. See Regione Siciliana v. Commission, Case C-417/04 P, [2006]
E.C.R. 1-3881, 1 24.
12. Roquette Frires v. Ministre de l'Agriculture, Case C-441/05, 1 40 (ECJ March
8, 2007) (not yet reported).
13. Administrazione delle Finanze dello Strato v. Simmenthal, Case 106/77,
[1978] E.C.R. 629.
14. Id. 16.
15. EC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 230, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 146 (2006).
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in one of three narrowly defined circumstances: (1) a private
plaintiff can seek annulment of a decision addressed to her; (2)
she can seek annulment of a decision addressed to another per-
son but that is of "direct and individual concern" to her; or (3)
she may ask for the annulment of a decision "in the form of a
regulation which is of direct and individual concern to her."1 6
Thus, private plaintiffs must show standing. That need to show
standing is the primary distinction between institutional and pri-
vate plaintiffs made in Article 230. It is not the only distinction
that is made between them, however.
It is that need to show standing imposed on private plain-
tiffs by Article 230, Section 4 that has been controversial and is
the subject of this Article. The precise meaning of the terms
"direct and individual concern" has been the subject of a great
deal of litigation and the interpretation given by the Court of
Justice to those terms has been controversial.
Yet the need to show standing must be seen in the context
of a second important distinction between private plaintiffs and
the privileged and semi-privileged applicants: the former can,
according to the literal wording of Article 230, Section 4, only
seek annulment of limited types of acts whereas the latter are not
so limited. Article 230, Sections 1 and 2 do not list the type of
acts that privileged and semi-privileged applicants can seek to
have annulled. Consequently, Article 230, Section 1, read to-
gether with Section 2, provides that the privileged and semi-priv-
ileged applicants can seek the annulment of any act, whether a
regulation, directive, decision, recommendation or opinion, or
any other kind of measure. a7 Article 230, Section 4, unlike Sec-
tions 1 and 2, does enumerate the types of acts which may be
challenged by private plaintiffs. Section 4 limits the action to
one directed to the annulment of a decision addressed to the
plaintiff, or of a decision addressed to another person or a regu-
lation which is of "direct and individual concern" to the plaintiff.
Thus, measures of general application are outside the scope of
an annulment action brought by a private plaintiff. In particu-
lar, private plaintiffs cannot seek the annulment of directives.
16. See KPE LASOK QC & TIMOTHY MILLET, JUDICIAL CONTROL IN THE EU: PROCE-
DURES AND PRINCIPLES 48 (2004).
17. See EC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 249, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 153 (2006) (defining
regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions).
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The omission of directives from the list of acts that can be
annulled under Article 230, Section 4 is significant, because
many Treaty articles require the Community Institutions to
adopt a measure in the form of a directive to the exclusion of
any other type of measure.18 Before the inclusion in the EC
Treaty of what is now Article 95, formerly Article 100a, by the
Single European Act, 9 Article 94 was the main legal basis per-
mitting the Institutions to adopt measures of harmonization of
law to bring about the common or internal market.2 0 Thus, Arti-
cle 94 coupled with Article 52, Section 1 on the harmonization
of legislation relating to the free movement of services, 2 1 meant
that the main domain of legislative activity by the Institutions was
outside the scope of actions for annulment brought by private
litigants. At least, according to the literal wording of Article 230,
Section 4.
The combination of those two distinctions made between
privileged and non-privileged applicants in Article 230 shows
that the Treaty originally intended to separate annulment ac-
tions of a constitutional nature, brought by the Institutions and
Member States on the one hand, from administrative actions
brought by private litigants on the other. The latter would only
be allowed before the Court of First Instance in exceptional cir-
cumstances, when the individual litigant was the addressee or
could be considered to be the addressee of the decision im-
pugned.
The second distinction is often played down by the critics of
the case-law on standing. The fact that the distinction was made
at all in the Treaty shows that it was clearly the intention of its
drafters to treat private plaintiffs differently from the institu-
tional plaintiffs. By playing down that distinction critics tend to
ignore the fact that the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (and
the Court of First Instance) is not general, but limited to one of
the procedures expressly prescribed by the Treaties.
18. See, e.g., id. arts. 44(1), 46(2), 47(1)-(2), 52(1), 63, 94, 96, 137(2), O.J. C 321
E/37, at 59, 61, 63, 79, 81, 108 (2006) (providing that the Institutions may adopt direc-
tives only).
19. Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 (amending
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11).
20. See EC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 94, OJ. C 321 E/37, at 79 (2006).
21. See id. art. 52, §1, O.J. C 321 E/l, at 63 (2006).
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The Court of Justice has had occasion to recall that basic
principle. In Confederation Francaise Democratique du Travail
("CFDT") v. Council, a French trade union, pursuant to Article 38
of the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity ("ECSC Treaty"), sought the annulment of a decision of the
Council requiring representative organizations to draw up lists
of candidates for the consultative committee referred to in Arti-
cle 18 of the ECSC Treaty. 22 The Court held that Article 38 pro-
vided that an act of the Council could only be annulled on an
application of a Member State or of the High Authority.2' The
Court stated that:
Whilst the principles upon which the Applicant relies call for
a wide interpretation of the provisions concerning the institu-
tion of proceedings before the Court with a view to ensuring
individuals' legal protection they do not permit the Court on
its own authority to amend the actual terms of its jurisdic-
tion.24
The fact that the Court's judgment concerned the ECSC Treaty,
not the EC Treaty, is immaterial. The important point the Court
was making was that while it was sensitive to the need to ensure
the legal protection of individuals, it could not provide that pro-
tection if the Treaty does not expressly confer jurisdiction on it
to do so.
This rationale contrasts with how the Court sees the ambit
of its jurisdiction to deal with institutional litigation-cases be-
tween Institutions and between Member States that concern the
application of EC law. The way in which the Court has ex-
amined disputes between Member States, which concern the ap-
plication of EC law, is particularly striking. In Commission v. Ire-
land, the Court held that disputes between Member States con-
cerning the application of EC law should be brought exclusively
before the Court of Justice and not before other international
jurisdictions.2 5 To reach that conclusion, the Court relied on
Article 292 of the EC Treaty, which provides that: "Member
States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the inter-
pretation or application of the EC Treaty to any method of set-
22. Confederation Francaise Democratique du Travail ("CFDT") v. Council, Case
66/76, [1977] E.C.R. 305.
23. The High Authority became the Commission.
24. See CFDT, [1977] E.C.R. 305, 1 8.
25. Commission v. Ireland, Case C-459/03, [2006] E.C.R. 1-4635.
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tlement other than those provided for therein."2 6 The practical
consequence is that Member States must use the infringement
procedure of Article 227, instead of bringing claims in interna-
tional courts or tribunals when the proper application of EC law
is at issue.
Thus the Court of Justice sees its jurisdiction to examine
claims by the Institutions and by the Member States-the privi-
leged applicants-as being the default jurisdiction. In contrast,
it does not see its jurisdiction to deal with actions by private
plaintiffs against the acts of the Institutions as being the default
jurisdiction. On the contrary, actions for annulment by private
litigants are permitted in limited circumstances only. A private
litigant must be either the express addressee of the decision in
order to seek its annulment or if she is not the addressee must,
to have standing, demonstrate that the decision addressed to an-
other person or the decision in the form of a regulation is of
"direct and individual concern" to her.
What meaning has the Court of Justice attributed to the
terms "direct and individual concern?" The principal case that
set out the Court of Justice's interpretation is Plaumann v. Com-
mission.27 The facts of this case were relatively simple. The Com-
mission addressed a decision to Germany, refusing a request by
the latter to suspend the collection of customs duties on the im-
port of fresh clementines in the EC. Plaumann was a German
company that imported clementines and sought to challenge the
Commission's decision addressed to Germany. The Court held
that Plaumann's action was inadmissible. 2' The Court found
that the two conditions of "direct and individual concern" were
cumulative, and consequently held that if Plaumann were not
individually concerned it would not be necessary to examine
whether it was directly concerned.29 The Court of Justice stated
that:
Persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed
may only claim to be individually concerned if that decision
affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar
to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are dif-
ferentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these fac-
26. Id. 123.
27. Plaumann v. Commission, Case 25/62, [1963] E.C.R. 95.
28. Id. at 107-08.
29. Id. at 107.
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tors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the
person addressed. In the present case the applicant is af-
fected by the disputed Decision as an importer of clemen-
tines, that is to say, by reason of a commercial activity which
may at any time be practiced by any person and is not there-
fore such as to distinguish the applicant in relation to the
contested Decision as in the case of an addressee. 0
What the Court of Justice was looking for and did not find in the
particular circumstances of the Plaumann company was a unique
feature which set it apart from all other importers, present and
future, of fresh clementines. So the Court was forced to con-
clude that Plaumann was in the same position as any importer of
clementines and anyone may engage in the activity of importing
them.
Perhaps a little surprisingly in retrospect, the Court did not
consider at the time that its interpretation of Article 230, Section
4 was a restrictive one. An issue that arose in that case was
whether the plaintiff Plaumann could challenge the Commission
decision addressed to Germany at all. The Commission, the de-
fendant in the case, submitted that the wording of Article 230,
Section 4 precluded an action for annulment against a decision
addressed to a Member State because it was not addressed to
"another person." Such decisions, the Commission claimed,
could only be attacked if they were addressed to other private
persons and not to Member States as sovereign authorities. The
Court rejected such an argument. It held that the wording of
the Article did not define or limit the scope of the term "ad-
dressed to another person" and "[t] he words and natural mean-
ing of this provision justify the broadest interpretation. Moreo-
ver, provisions of the Treaty regarding the right of interested
parties to bring an action must not be interpreted restrictively."'"
In contrast, the Court clearly thought that the term "individual
concern" was capable of one interpretation only, according to its
natural meaning.
That restrictive reading of "individual concern" has given
rise to abundant case law in which applications have been dis-
missed for lack of standing because the plaintiff was unable to
show that she had some unique or distinguishing feature. Thus,
30. Id.
31. Id. at 106-07.
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the fact that the action is brought by a person who could be
identified as a person to whom a regulation clearly applies is in-
sufficient to confer that unique quality necessary for standing
under the Plaumann rule.32
As for the meaning of the term "direct concern," with which
the Court did not deal in Plaumann, the Court has held that a
measure can be of direct concern if it comprises "a complete set
of rules which are sufficient in themselves and . . .require no
implementing provisions."3 If a measure confers discretion on
the national authorities charged with implementing it then it
will not be of direct concern to a private litigant.34 For example,
the sole national isoglucose producer would not be "directly con-
cerned" by an EC measure regarding the allocation of national
production quantities of isoglucose, if such measure provides no
guarantee to the sole producer in a given Member State, without
a decision taken by the national authorities.35 On the other
hand, if a measure leaves no discretion to its addressee, its imple-
mentation being purely automatic and resulting from Commu-
nity rules without the application of other intermediate rules,
the measure will be of "direct concern" to a person whose legal
situation is affected by it. 36
B. The Indirect Route of Questioning Validity
through National Courts
So where should private litigants take their complaints
about the illegality of a measure adopted by the Community In-
stitutions which is not addressed to them? The first paragraph of
Article 234 of the EC Treaty gives the answer. It provides that
the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
on "the validity and interpretation of acts of the Institutions of
the Community and of the [European Central Bank] .37 Thus,
private parties must bring an action before a court of a Member
32. See Zuckerfabrik Watenstedt v. Council, Case 6/68, [1968] E.C.R. 409.
33. Partie Ecologiste "Les Verts" ("The Greens") v. European Parliament, Case
294/83, [1986] E.C.R. 1339, 1 31.
34. See Int'l Fruit v. Commission,Joined Cases 41-44/70, [1971] E.C.R. 411, It 23-
28.
35. See Roquette Frires v. Ministre de I'Agriculture, Case C-441/05, 1 46 (ECJ
March 8, 2007) (not yet reported).
36. See Regione Siciliana v. Commission, Case C-417/04 P, [2006] E.C.R 1-3881, 1
28.
37. EC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 234, OJ. C 321 E/37, at 147 (2006).
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State which can, in turn, seek a ruling from the Court of Justice
on the validity of the EC measure.
The manner in which that procedure is understood and
configured shows that it is in fact the primary or default route
through which private plaintiffs should seek review of the validity
of Community acts of general application.
Indeed, it is a procedure that applies more broadly than the
action for annulment. The salient feature of Article 234, first
paragraph, subsection (b) is that it employs the term "acts" of
the Institutions. Thus, the Court of Justice can rule on the valid-
ity of any type or form of act adopted by the Institutions,
whether they be regulations, directives, decisions or any other
kind of measure. It would appear that the power of the EC to
conclude an international agreement could be reviewed in the
preliminary reference procedure. 8 Even non-binding acts can
be reviewed under the preliminary reference procedure. 39 That
of course differentiates the review of validity under the prelimi-
nary reference procedure from the action for annulment which
can only be directed against a legally binding act.
A major difference between the review of the legality of an
act under Article 234 and an action brought under Article 230 is
that the Court is not constrained by any time limit to examine
the issue of validity. Article 230, Section 5 provides that every
action for annulment, regardless of who brings it, must be
brought within two months of the publication of the measure or
of its notification to the plaintiff, or if the measure is not pub-
lished, of the day on which the plaintiff knew of it. There is no
equivalent under Article 234 to that two month limitation pe-
riod. Nor is the Court "limited by the grounds on which the
validity of ... measures [adopted by the Institutions] may be
contested."4 Under Article 230, measures can only be annulled
for the reasons set out in that provision. Under Article 234, on
the other hand, the Court has reviewed the legality of a Commu-
nity act in the light of customary international law.41
38. See Draft understanding on a Local Cost Standard drawn up under the aus-
pices of the OECD, Opinion 1/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1355, 1361.
39. See Grimaldi v. Fonds de Maladies Professionnelles, Case C-322/88, [1989]
E.C.R. 4407, 8.
40. See Int'l Fruit v. Commission, Joined Cases 41-44/70, [1971] E.C.R. 411, 5.
41. See Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt, Case C-162/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-3655,
26.
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The juxtaposition of the action for annulment with that of
the possibility of a preliminary reference procedure in which the
Court can review the validity of Community acts led the Court of
Justice to characterize the system of remedies and procedures in
the EC as:
[A] complete system of legal remedies and procedures de-
signed to permit the court ofjustice to review the legality of
measures adopted by the institutions. Natural and legal per-
sons are thus protected against the application to them of
general measures which they cannot contest directly before
the court by reason of the special conditions of admissibility
laid down in the second paragraph of Article 173 of the
Treaty.4 2
The Court of Justice itself placed one limitation on the right to
raise a plea of invalidity of Community acts in national courts.
In TWD Textilwerke Deggendof GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
the Court held that a person who could have brought an action
to annul an act under Article 230, Section 4, but did not do so
cannot subsequently question the validity of that same act before
the national courts.43 However, the Court of Justice made it
clear in Accrington Beef that where it was improbable that the
plaintiffs in the national court would have had standing to sue
under Article 230, Section 4, they remain at liberty to question
the validity of a regulation in the national proceedings.' The
Court of Justice recently held that a private party is barred from
pleading the illegality of an EC measure only if it is beyond
doubt that she had standing to annul the measure under Article
230, Section 4.45
While the indirect route to challenge the validity of EC acts
is not subject to any time limits, it inherently contains the means
of filtering cases that are not ripe for litigation. The Court of
42. Partie Ecologiste "Les Verts" ("The Greens") v. European Parliament, Case
294/83, [1986] E.C.R. 1339, 23.
43. TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Case C-
188/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-833; see also Nachi Europe GmbH Hauptzollamt Krefeld, Case
C-239/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-1197, 37.
44. The Queen v. Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce, exparte Accrington
Beef Co., Case C-241/95, [1996] E.C.R. 1-6699, 15. The Court of Justice handed
down a similar ruling in respect of the validity of a directive. See Eurotunnel SA v.
SeaFrance, Case C-408/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-6315, 1 29-30.
45. See Roquette Frres v. Ministre de l'Agriculture, Case C-441/05, 1 48 (ECJ
March 8, 2007) (not yet reported).
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Justice has held recently that it is for the national court to ex-
amine whether the claim made by the private litigant concerning
the validity of the EC measure is meritorious or not. Only if the
national court considers that a plausible case of invalidity is
made does it need to refer the matter to the Court of Justice for
a definitive ruling. In The Queen on the application of" International
Air Transport Association, European Low Fares Airline Association v.
Department for Transport, the Court stated that:
Article 234 EC does not constitute a means of redress availa-
ble to the parties to a case pending before a national court
and therefore the mere fact that a party contends that the
dispute gives rise to a question concerning the validity of
Community law does not mean that the court concerned is
compelled to consider that a question has been raised within
the meaning of Article 234 EC (see, to this effect, Case 283/
81 Cilfit [1982] ECR 3415, paragraph 9). Accordingly, the fact
that the validity of a Community act is contested before a na-
tional court is not in itself sufficient to warrant referral of a
question to the Court for a preliminary ruling.
The Court has held that courts against whose decisions there
is a judicial remedy under national law may examine the va-
lidity of a Community act and, if they consider that the argu-
ments put forward before them by the parties in support of
invalidity are unfounded, they may reject them, concluding
that the act is completely valid. In so doing, they are not call-
ing into question the existence of the Community act.46
That inbuilt mechanism for deciding the most appropriate time
for judicial review is an important element in the overall system.
The time factor is one that is frequently overlooked in the dis-
cussions about judicial review, as pointed out by Mashaw:
[M]ost fights about judicial review of agency action have re-
volved around who could seek review, what could be reviewed,
or how review should be focused or substantively constrained.
A game-theoretical analysis, combined with the consideration
of the likely efficacy of other reform approaches, suggests, by
contrast, that when review can be sought may be the most im-
portant question to consider.
4 7
46. The Queen on the application of: Int'l Air Transp. Ass'n, European Low Fares
Airline Ass'n v. Dep't for Transp., Case C-344/04, [2006] E.C.R. 1403, 1 28-29 (citing
Firma Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lubeck-Ost, Case 314/85, [1987] E.C.R. 4199, 14).
47. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 160 (1997).
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C. The Accommodations Made to the Rules on
Standing in Article 230, Section 4
Over the years, both the Court of Justice and the Court of
First Instance have found accommodations within the strict in-
terpretation of the standing rule for private plaintiffs in Article
230, Section 4.
The most notable element of flexibility introduced by the
case law of both the Court of Justice and of the Court of First
Instance concerns the type of measures that can be annulled at
the request of a private plaintiff under Article 230, Section 4. As
early as 1967 the Court of Justice was ready to jettison the strict
taxonomy of acts of Article 230, Section 4 to allow a challenge
against a sui generis decision adopted by the Commission in the
course of a competition proceeding. The Court of Justice has
never held that a directive cannot be challenged as a matter of
principle even though it is clearly absent from the list of acts in
Article 230, Section 4 that can be annulled. In reality, the Court
of Justice has treated a directive the same way as any other act
and considered only whether it was of direct and individual con-
cern to the private plaintiff.48
In UEAPME v. Council, the Court of First Instance accepted
that a directive can be impugned under Article 230, Section 4.4"
The action in that case was dismissed as inadmissible on the
ground that the measure in question conferred no specific rights
on the plaintiff. Actions for the annulment of directives usually
fail because the measure requires implementation by the Mem-
ber States and therefore is not of "direct concern" to the plain-
tiffs.5° In reality, the Court of Justice has abandoned characteriz-
ing the act the annulment of which is sought as a "decision:" it
uses the terms "act" and "decision" synonymously and requires
only that they are "measures the legal effects of which are bind-
ing on, and capable of affecting the interests of, the applicant by
bringing about a distinct change in his legal position."51
48. See Government of Gibraltar v. Council, Case C-298/89, [1993] E.C.R. 1-3605,
16-17.
49. Union Europ6enne de l'Artisant et des Petites et Moyennes Enterprises
("UEAPME") v. Council, Case T-135/96, [1998] E.C.R. 11-2335, 1 63-69.
50. See, e.g., Salamander v. European Parliament & Council, Joined Cases T-172/
98, T-175-178/98, [2000] E.C.R. 11-2487, 1 54, 70.
51. See RJ. Reynolds v. Commission, Case C-131/03 P, 54 (ECJ Sept. 12, 2006)
(not yet reported).
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By adopting a much more flexible approach to the charac-
terization of the act which the private plaintiff seeks to annul,
the Courts have considerably enhanced the possibilities for judi-
cial protection under Article 230, Section 4. In reality they have
abandoned the distinction made originally in the Treaty be-
tween constitutional and administrative review. It has to be con-
ceded, however, that such flexibility is not easily reconciled with
the wording of Article 230, Section 4, and Albertina Albors-
Llorens has pointed out that the result has been "a true re-draft-
ing of the Treaty by the Court. '52
It is not a foregone conclusion that an action for annulment
of a generally applicable measure introduced by a private litigant
will be rejected. In practice, the Courts engage in a meticulous
examination of the measures impugned and the particular situa-
tion of the plaintiff to see if she has some unique characteristics
that permit the action to be accepted. There are many instances
in which the Courts have found such unique characteristics.
Space does not permit a detailed review of all of them, but a few
are notable.
For instance, the Court of Justice has held that the Commu-
nity institution may have been under a duty to take account of
the specific circumstances of the plaintiff before adopting a mea-
sure. If that is the case, the plaintiff will be granted standing to
annul such measure. In Piraiki-Patraiki v. Commission, the Court
of Justice held that the Commission was under a duty to take
account of the position of exporters, who had already concluded
contracts for the sale of cotton from Greece, when adopting a
decision,53 under Article 130 of the Act of Accession of the Hel-
lenic Republic, addressed to a Member State and authorizing it
to impose a system of quotas.5" Consequently, the Court of Jus-
tice held that those traders under contract at the time of the
adoption of the decision impugned were granted standing to
challenge it.55
As another example, the holder of a specific right, such as
an intellectual property right, will be granted standing to seek
the annulment of an act that adversely affects that right. In
52. ALBERTINA ALBORS-LLORENS, PRIVATE PARTIES IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
104-05 (1996).
53. Commission Decision No. 81/988/EEC, O.J. L 362, at 33 (1981).
54. Piraiki-Patraiki v. Commission, Case 11/82, [1985] E.C.R. 207, 31.
55. Id. 31-32.
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Codorniu v. Council, the Court of Justice held that a Spanish wine
producer that owned the trademark Gran Cremant de Codorniu
was individually concerned by a regulation 56 that reserved the
use of the term crimant to sparkling wine producers situated in
France and Luxembourg.5v The Court of First Instance recently
went one step further and held, in Infront WArM AG v. Commission,
that the exclusive holder of broadcasting rights was individually
concerned by a measure that affected the exclusive nature of the
retransmission in a Member State.58
If a person is named in a measure and that person's particu-
lar situation was taken into account during the adoption of the
measure, she will be individually concerned and will be granted
standing to seek its annulment. In Atlantean Ltd. v. Commission
and Cathal Boyle v. Commission, the owners of fishing vessels were
granted standing to challenge a Commission decision, 59 ad-
dressed to Ireland, that refused to increase the fishing capacity
of certain named vessels owned by them.6"
In a similar manner, if a person has the legal right to partici-
pate in the procedure leading to the adoption of the measure it
then seeks to challenge, that person will have standing to seek its
annulment under Article 230, Section 4.6 The salient point is
that EC legislation must expressly provide that the private plain-
tiff had the right to participate in the legislative or administrative
procedure. In practice, such participatory rights are exercised
before the Commission. The considerable development of par-
ticipatory rights has meant that many acts adopted by the Com-
mission can in fact be annulled at the request of private plain-
tiffs.
62
Another example that illustrates well the careful and de-
56. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2045/89, amending Council Regulation No.
3309/85, O.J. 1989 L 202 (1989), at 12.
57. Codornfu SA v. Council, Case C-309/89, [1994] E.C.R. 1-1853.
58. Infront WAIM AG v. Commission, Case T-33/01, [2005] E.C.R. 11-5897, 7 167.
This case is currently under appeal. See Commission v. Infront WM AG, Case C-125/06
P, O.J. C 108, at 7 (2006).
59. See Commission Decision No. 2003/245/EC (2003), O.J. L 90, at 48 (2003).
60. Atlantean Ltd. v. Commission, Case T-192/03, [2006] E.C.R. 11-42, 1 46; Cathal
Boyle v. Commission, Joined Cases T-218-240/03, [2006] E.C.R. 1699, 7 49.
61. See Gov't of the Netherlands Antilles v. Commission, Joined Cases T-32, T-41
98, [2000] E.C.R. 11-201, 7 51-56.
62. See Francesca Bignami, Creating European Rights: National Values and Suprana-
tional Interests, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 243, 258-336 (2005).
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tailed analysis undertaken to see if a particular plaintiff is di-
rectly or individually concerned is that of operators who seek to
challenge Commission regulations classifying goods in the Com-
bined Nomenclature. Traditionally, the Court of Justice has
held that individual operators lack standing to challenge such
regulations, as they are measures having a general application
which apply to situations determined objectively and entail legal
effects for categories of persons regarded generally and in the
abstract in a manner.63 In one case, Sony Computer Entertainment
Europe Ltd. v. Commission, the Court of First Instance undertook a
detailed analysis of the facts and of the particular situation of the
plaintiff and concluded that Sony was individually concerned by
a regulation64 classifying its Playstation in the Combined Nomen-
clature.6 5
In particular areas such as the control of state aids, competi-
tion law, merger control and anti-dumping law, the Court ofJus-
tice and the Court of First Instance have held that specific cate-
gories of persons can be individually concerned by measures
taken by the Institutions in those fields and thus can have stand-
ing to annul them under Article 230, Section 4.66 For example,
in Extramet Industrie v. Council, the Court of Justice granted
standing to an independent importer to challenge anti-dumping
measures because its particular economic situation caused it to
be individually concerned by those measures.67
Admittedly, those refinements made by the Court of Justice
and the Court of First Instance to rules on standing for private
plaintiffs are incremental in nature and do not shake the foun-
dations of the interpretation of Article 230, Section 4 given in
Plaumann. They are small steps compared to the considerable
63. See Casteels PVBA v. Commission, Case 40/84, [1985] E.C.R. 667; see also Alce
v. Commission, Case T-120/98, [1999] E.C.R. 11-1395; Industria pugliese olive in
salamoia erbe aromatiche Snc ("Iposea") v. Commission, Case T-49/00, [2001] E.C.R.
11-163, 31.
64. Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1400/2001, O.J. L 189, at 5 (2001).
65. Sony Computer Ent. Europe Ltd. v. Commission, Case T-243/01, [2003] E.C.R.
114189. Two other cases are pending in which a similar claim is made by the plaintiff.
See Apple Computer Int'l v. Commission, Case T-82/06, OJ. C 108, at 26 (2006); Secur-
ity Ireland Ltd. v. Commission, Case T-227/06, O.J. C 249, at 15 (2006). But see Tokai
Europe GmbH v. Commission, Case T-183/04 (CFI Order of Mar. 19, 2007) (declaring
a similar action to be inadmissible.
66. See generally KOEN LENAERTS ET AL., PROCEDURAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
264-80 (2006); ALBORS-LLORENS, supra note 52, at 152-70.
67. Extramet Industrie SA v. Council, Case C-358/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2501.
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improvement to the position of the European Parliament made
by the Court ofJustice in European Parliament v. Council.6" In that
case, the Court of Justice allowed the European Parliament to
have standing to bring an action against acts of the Council or
the Commission on condition "that the action seeks only to safe-
guard its prerogatives and that it is founded only on submissions
alleging their infringement."6 9 That judgment was remarkable
because the right of the European Parliament to sue was not rec-
ognized by Article 230 as it was in force at the time.
One commentator has posed the question whether the lib-
eral attitude of the Court of Justice to the standing of European
Parliament, when contrasted with its fairly rigorous attitude to-
wards private litigants, is a case of double standards.70 It would
seem not. There is a fundamental difference in the position of
the two categories of plaintiffs: if the European Parliament can-
not bring an action for annulment under Article 230, no alterna-
tive procedural route is open to it. Private litigants, however,
have the courts of the Member States at their disposal via which
the validity of Community acts, broadly defined, can be re-
viewed.
II. CRITICISMS, CHALLENGES AND REFORMS
(OR LACK THEREOF)
A. Criticisms
The requirement of standing for private plaintiffs and the
need for them to show "direct and individual concern" has been
almost universally criticized by commentators. Typical is the
statement by Grafnne de Burca, who writes:
There are few questions on which the EU law academic world
(not to mention the CFI and Advocate Generals of the ECJ) is
so united as that the right of individuals to seek judicial re-
view by the ECJ under Article 230 is excessively restrictive and
that it undermines respect for the principle of access to jus-
tice in the EU. 7 '
68. European Parliament v. Council, Case C-70/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2041.
69. Id. 27.
70. See Arnull, supra note 6, at 177-90. He concludes it is not a case of double
standards. See id. at 189.
71. Grainne De Burca, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, in TEN REFLECTIONS ON
THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY FOR EUROPE 26 (Bruno de Witte ed., 2003), available at
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/e-texts/200304-1ORefConsTreaty.pdf.
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This assertion is certainly true for academic writers as they tend
to consider that the Court has interpreted Article 230, Section 4
too restrictively. Paul Craig criticizes the reasoning of the Court
of Justice in conceptual terms because it renders "it literally im-
possible for an applicant ever to succeed, except in a very limited
category of retrospective cases.
72
Indeed, a plethora of distinguished writers have deplored
over the years the restrictive interpretation of the rule of stand-
ing for private litigants by the Court of Justice.73 One notable
exception is Stefan Enchelmaier who concludes a thoughtful
study of the standing of private plaintiffs by stating that "[t]he
Community system for the protection of individual rights, as in-
terpreted by the European Court of Justice is better than the
criticism of the jurisprudence on Art. 230(4) EC may lead one to
believe."74
Criticisms have not been the exclusive domain of academic
writers. In the second paragraph of his famous Opinion in
Uni6n de Pequefios Agricultores ("UPA") v. Council, Advocate Gen-
eral Jacobs pointed out not only that five other members of the
Court of Justice or the Court of First Instance had criticized the
requirements of standing in their personal capacity in extra-judi-
cial writings, but that various opinions of other Advocates Gen-
72. Paul Craig, Legality, Standing and Substantive Review in Community Law, 14 Ox-
FORDJ. LEGAL STUD. 507, 509 (1994).
73. See generally Anthony Arnull, Private Applicants and the Actionfor Annulment Under
Article 173 of the EEC Treaty, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 7, (1995); Anthony Arnull, Private
Applications and the Action for Annulment Since Codorniu, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 7
(2001); Anthony Arnull, ChallengingEC Anti-Dumping Regulations: The Problem of Admissi-
bility, 13 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 73 (1992); Ami Barav, Direct and Individual Concern:
An Almost Insurmontable Barrier to the Admissibility of Individual Appeal to the EEC, 11 COM-
MON MKT. L. REV. 191 (1974); Laurence W. Gormley, Judicial Review in EC and EULaw-
Some Architectural Malfunctions and Design Improvements?, 4 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL
STUD. 167 (2001); Carol Harlow, Towards a Theoy ofAccess for the European Court ofJustice,
12 Y.B. EUR. L. 213 (1992); Hjalte Reasmussen, Why is Art. 173 Interpreted Against Private
Plaintiffs?, 5 EUR. L. REv. 112 (1980); Georges Vandersanden, Pour un Elargissement du
Droit des Particuliers D'Agir en Annulation Contre des Actes Autres que les Ddcisions qui leur sont
Adresses, 31 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPCEN [CAH. DR. EUR.] 535 (1995); Denis Waelbroeck
& A.M. Verheyden, Les Conditions de Recevabilitg des Recours en Annulation des Particuliers
Contre des Actes Normatifs Communautaires: A La Lumiere du Droit Comparg et de la Conven-
tion desDroits de l'Homme, 31 CAH. DR. EUR. 399 (1995).
74. Stefan Enchelmaier, No-One Slips Through the Net? Latest Developments, and Non-
Developments, in the European Court ofJustice'sJurisprudence on Art. 230(4) EC 62 (Inst. Eur.
& Comp. L., Univ. of Oxford, Working Paper 3, 2004), available at http://denning.law.
ox.ac.uk/iecl/pdfs/working3enchelmaier.pdf.
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eral were critical of them also.75
The Courts themselves seemed to pay little heed to those
criticisms. Until its judgment in Jggo-Qur9 & Cie SA v. Commis-
sion, even the Court of First Instance had not seriously and
openly challenged the Court of Justice to modify the require-
ments of standing for private plaintiffs.76
B. Challenges: The Summer of 2002 and the UPA
and J6go Qur6 Cases
When the Court of First Instance did challenge the rule of
standing in 2002, the results were surprising. The sequence of
events is revelatory in itself and casts an interesting light on the
outcome of the Court of First Instance's challenge. Above all,
the events of 2002 reveal in a fascinating way how the Court of
Justice envisages the system of judicial review.
The opportunity presented itself almost accidentally be-
cause of the sequential examination of two similar sets of cases:
Unidn de Pequefos Agricultores ("UPA ") v. Council at first instance,77
UPA v. Council on appeal;7' and Jgo-Qu6rg & Cie SA v. Commission
at first instance, 79 and Commission v. Jggo-Qur & Cie SA on ap-
peal. °
The previous case-law of the Court of First Instance shows
that it did not consistently and deliberately look for an opportu-
nity to challenge the fundamentals of the ruling of the Court of
Justice in Plaumann. After all, the Court of First Instance was
invited by Greenpeace some years before, in Greenpeace v. Com-
mission, to interpret the terms "direct and individual concern"
more broadly in environmental cases.8 The Court of First In-
stance categorically refused to do so.82 It was upheld by the
75. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Uni6n de Pequefios Agricultores
("UPA") v. Council, Case C-50/00P, [2003] Q.B. 893, 897-98.
76. Jgo-Qu6r & Cie SA v. Commission, Case T-177/01, [2002] E.C.R. 11-2365.
77. Uni6n de Pequefios Agricultores ("UPA") v. Council, Case T- 173/98, [1999]
E.C.R. 11-3353.
78. Uni6n de Pequeflos Agricultores ("UPA") v. Council, Case C-50/00 P, [2002]
E.C.R. 1-6677.
79. Jigo-QuHr, [2002] E.C.R. II-2365.
80. Commission v. J6go-Qu6r6 & Cie SA, Case C-263/02 P, [2004] E.C.R. 1-3425.
81. Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace Int'l) v. Commission, Case T-585/
93, [1995] E.C.R. 11-2205.
82. Id. I 62-65.
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Court of Justice on appeal by Greenpeace.8" In fact, the Court
of First Instance had a number of opportunities to reinterpret
Article 230, Section 4 in light of the need to ensure effective
judicial review. Each time it declined to do so.8 4
Nor at first did it seem from the attitude of the Court of
First Instance that it would seek to question the Plaumann inter-
pretation of Article 230, Section 4 when it ruled on the first case,
UPA.15 In that case, the applicant, UPA, was a Spanish associa-
tion of farmers who sought to annul a regulation on the granting
of aid for the production of olive oil.8 6 The Court of First In-
stance summarily dismissed the case as inadmissible by an Order
made under Article 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court
of First Instance on the ground that the applicant was not indi-
vidually concerned by the regulation in question. 7 In so doing,
the Court of First Instance was doing no more than scrupulously
following the existing case-law on standing.
Then, UPA appealed to the Court ofJustice. It claimed that
if it were not granted standing to challenge the regulation it
would be deprived of any right of access to a court: Because the
measure in question was a regulation, it did not entail any imple-
menting measure by the national authorities which they could
challenge before the Spanish courts."- Thus, an action for an-
nulment in the Court of First Instance under Article 230, Section
4 was its only hope of seeking redress.
Serendipitously, the case in the Court of Justice was allo-
cated to Advocate General Jacobs. His opinion of March 21,
83. See Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace Int'l) v. Commission, Case C-
321/95, [1998] E.C.R. 1-1651.
84. See Berthu v. Council, Case T-207/97, [1998] E.C.R. 11-509, 1 29; Van Parijs v.
Commission, Case T-11/99, [1999] E.C.R. 11-2653, 54; see also Soci& des plantations
de Mbanga SA (SPM) v. Commission, Case T447/05, 82 (CFI Jan. 12, 2007) (not yet
reported); Socit6 des plantations de Mbanga SA (SPM) v. Commission, Case T-104/06,
1 82 (CFI Jan. 12, 2007) (not yet reported).
85. Uni6n de Pequefios Agricultores ("UPA") v. Council, Case T- 173/98, [1999]
E.C.R. 11-3357.
86. See Council Regulation (EC) No. 1639/98, O.J. L 210/32 (1998), amending
Regulation (EEC) No 2261/84.
87. See UPA, [1999] E.C.R. 11-3357; Consolidated Version of the Rules of Proce-
dure of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, art. 111, O.J. L 103,
at 6 (1997), available at http://curia.europa.eu/en/instit/txtdocfr/txtsenvigueur/txt7.
pdf.
88. See Uni6n de Pequefios Agricultores ("UPA") v. Council, Case -50/00 P,
[2002] E.C.R. 1-6677, 61.
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2002 contains a most fully reasoned and thoughtful critique of
the existing case-law on standing. 9 He considered that the ex-
isting case-law on standing of individual applicants was "prob-
lematic. '"90 He opined that proceedings before national courts
may not in reality provide effective judicial protection with the
result that in some cases no legal protection of individuals will be
available at all,9" and considered that actions for annulment
under Article 230 are more "appropriate" for determining the
validity of EC acts than reference proceedings under Article
234.92 Yet, Advocate General Jacobs disagreed with the submis-
sion of UPA that standing should be granted to challenge a regu-
lation where the circumstances of the case reveal that the plain-
tiff would otherwise be denied effective judicial protection. He
found no basis for that interpretation in the wording of Article
230, Section 4.9 In particular, he found it unsatisfactory to
make standing in the EC Courts contingent upon the lack of it
in a national court.94 Thus, the Advocate General did not wish
to change the relationship between national courts and the EC
courts fundamentally by turning the annulment action before
the EC courts into the default procedure for private litigants to
challenge EC measures of general application. The only solu-
tion, according to Advocate General Jacobs was to change the
interpretation of the term "individual concern." He proposed
that "a person is to be regarded as individually concerned by a
Community measure where, by reason of particular circum-
stances, the measure has, or is liable to have, a substantial ad-
verse effect on his interests."95
One feature of Advocate General Jacobs' opinion is particu-
larly interesting. Notwithstanding his trenchant criticisms of the
rule on standing of private litigants, he considered that a satisfac-
tory solution could be found within the existing wording of Arti-
cle 230, Section 4. He did not contemplate jettisoning com-
pletely all restrictions on standing for private litigants so that
89. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Uni6n de Pequefios Agricultores
("UPA") v. Council, Case C-50/00 P, [2002] E.C.R. 1-6677.
90. Id. 37.
91. See id. 99 38-44.
92. Id. 1 45-48.
93. See id. 9 50-52.
94. Id. 53.
95. Id. 60.
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"any person adversely affected by a measure has standing to chal-
lenge it" as is the case in French law.9 6 His criticism was aimed at
the case law of the Court of Justice, not at the scheme of the
Treaty itself. Clearly he thought that his "substantial adverse ef-
fect" test could replace the rule set out in Plaumann without
changing the terms of Article 230, Section 4. After all, he saw no
reason why the notion of individual concern requires that an in-
dividual applicant seeking the annulment of a measure of gen-
eral application must be differentiated from all others affected
by it in the same way as an addressee.97
The problem is that any rule limiting standing, even the one
proposed by Advocate General Jacobs, may have a degree of in-
determinacy and requires interpretation. He did not explain
what would happen to litigants who failed his "substantial ad-
verse effect" test. Presumably they would be left to fend for
themselves in the national courts. Nor did he give any reassur-
ance to the Court, other than stating that his test could be ac-
commodated by the terms of Article 230, Section 4, that the test
he proposed to replace the Plaumann rule would not lead to a
fundamental transformation of a decentralized system of en-
forcement and turn the Community courts into the default sys-
tem for enforcing individual rights. That difficulty, which is ex-
plored further below, was not lost on the Court of First Instance
which in the meantime was confronted with another case.
By that time, a second case had been lodged with the Court
of First Instance-Jggo-Qur. 98 It concerned an action brought
by a French fishing company to annul parts of a Commission
regulation imposing minimum fish net mesh sizes in order to
reduce catches ofjuvenile hake.99 The plaintiff asserted that the
regulation would have serious consequences on its fishing activi-
ties, that it required no implementing measure at the national
level, and if it were denied standing under Article 230, Section 4
it would be bereft of any remedy.
Clearly, the same issue of standing was raised in Jgo-Qurtg as
in UPA. And the sequence of events becomes important and
reveals its own moral of the story. The action in Jigo-Qurg was
96. Id. 85.
97. Id. 59.
98. Jego-Qur6 & Cie SA v. Commission, Case T-177/01, [2002] E.C.R. 11-2365.
99. See Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1162/2001, O.J. L 159/4 (2001).
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commenced on August 2, 2001. The written procedure was
closed and the hearing was held on April 16, 2002, less than a
month after Advocate General Jacobs' opinion in UPA. The
Court of First Instance did not issue an order declaring J6go-
Qu6r6's action clearly inadmissible as it had done in UPA. Nor
did the Court of First Instance stay the proceedings in Jigo-Qur9
until the judgment of the Court of Justice in UPA as it could
have done under Article 54, Section 3 of the Protocol on the
Statute of the Court of Justice.1 °° The Court of First Instance
probably sensed that a unique opportunity offered itself to re-
consider the whole issue of standing of private litigants seeking
the annulment of measures of general application. Advocate
General Jacobs' opinion was after all trenchant, fully reasoned
and very persuasive.
The Court of First Instance went right ahead and handed
down a judgment in Jgo-Qu& 9 on May 3, 2002. It held that the
action was admissible, but it did not adopt Advocate General Ja-
cobs' "substantial adverse effect" test. Instead, it held that:
[An individual] is to be regarded as individually concerned by
a Community measure of general application that concerns
him directly if the measure in question affects his legal posi-
tion, in a manner which is both definite and immediate, by
restricting his rights or by imposing obligations on him. The
number and position of other persons who are likewise af-
fected by the measure, or who may be so, are of no relevance
in that regard.1'
Presumably, the Court of First Instance thought that its reinter-
pretation of Article 230, Section 4 would not fundamentally
change the system and yet could accommodate the plaintiffJ~go-
Qu~r6 satisfactorily.
The important twist in the rules on standing brought about
by the Court of First Instance was the requirement that the pri-
vate litigant be affected in a manner that is "definite and imme-
diate." The Court of First Instance had noted in Paragraph 45 of
its judgment that there were "no acts of implementation capable
of forming the basis of an action before national courts. ' 10 2 In
100. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Dec. 24, 2003,
O.J. C 325/5, at 179 (2002).
101. Jggo-Qu&r6, [2002] E.C.R. 11-2365, 51.
102. Id. 45
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those circumstances an individual would have to breach the
rules imposed by the EC before she could assert their illegality in
subsequent national proceedings. Presciently, the Court of First
Instance found that such a modus operandi did not constitute an
adequate means of judicial protection.
The reasoning and solution of the Court of First Instance in
its judgment in Jgo-Qu6re meant taking a risk. It was navigating
remarkably close to accepting the submission UPA had made
that standing should be granted to challenge a regulation where
the circumstances of the case reveal that the plaintiff would oth-
erwise be denied effective judicial protection." And Advocate
General Jacobs had rejected this argument as having no basis in
the wording of Article 230, Section 4.'"4 Perhaps that seemed
like a risk worth taking for the Court of First Instance. The solu-
tion it adopted seemed like an incremental change that could be
made in the light of the principle of effective judicial protection
by a first instance court. If it had adopted the "substantial harm"
test the Court of First Instance would clearly have put itself at
odds with the existing case-law of the higher court.
The appeal in the UPA case was still pending when the
Court of First Instance handed down its judgment in Jigo-Qu6re.
The Court of Justice spotted that difficulty in the Court of First
Instance's judgment in Jdgo-Qu6r- and moved swiftly, handing
down its adamantine judgment on July 25, 2002.105 It held in
paragraph 43 of its judgment:
As the Advocate General has pointed out in paragraphs 50 to
53 of his Opinion, it is not acceptable to adopt an interpreta-
tion of the system of remedies, such as that favoured by the
appellant, to the effect that a direct action for annulment
before the Community Court will be available where it can be
shown, following an examination by that Court of the particu-
lar national procedural rules, that those rules do not allow
the individual to bring proceedings to contest the validity of
the Community measure at issue. Such an interpretation
would require the Community Court, in each individual case,
to examine and interpret national procedural law. That
103. See Uni6n de Pequefios Agricultores ("UPA") v. Council, Case C-50/00 P,
[2002] E.C.R. 1-6677.
104. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Uni6n de Pequefios Agricultores
("UPA") v. Council, Case C-50/00 P, [2002] E.C.R. 1-6677, 50-52.
105. See UPA, [2002] E.C.R. 1-6677.
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would go beyond its jurisdiction when reviewing the legality
of Community measures.
1 0 6
It upheld the Court of First Instance's order in that case and
declared that UPA lacked standing to annul Regulation 1638/
98. It seemed to overrule the judgment of the Court of First In-
stance in Jego-Qudr6.
The Court ofJustice reviewed the existing case-law on stand-
ing in its judgment and pointed out that Articles 230, 241 and
234 established a complete system of remedies and procedures
designed to ensure judicial review of the legality of the acts of
the Institutions. °7 The right to effective judicial protection is
one of the general principles of law stemming from the constitu-
tional traditions of the Member States and has been enshrined
in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.10 8 When
private plaintiffs cannot obtain redress via Article 230, Section 4,
the Court points out that they may, depending on the case, ei-
ther indirectly plead the invalidity of those acts in the EC courts
under Article 241 or plead their invalidity before the national
courts and seek a reference to the Court of Justice for a ruling
on their validity under Article 234.109 The Court thus reaffirmed
the decentralized system for enforcing the rights of private liti-
gants. It brushed aside any criticism that the indirect, decentral-
ized system was inadequate by stating "it is for the Member States
to establish a system of legal remedies and procedures which en-
sure respect for the right of effective judicial protection."110
The Court of Justice also held that the interpretation given
in Plaumann was the only one possible of Article 230, Section 4
and rejected the alternatives proposed by Advocate General Ja-
cobs and the Court of First Instance as going "beyond the juris-
diction conferred by the Treaty on the Community Courts."1 1
The fate of the outcome of the appeal lodged by the Com-
mission against the judgment in Jgo-Qug was thus sealed. Ad-
vocate General Jacobs was once again appointed to deliver an
106. Id. 43
107. See id. 40.
108. See id. 39.
109. See id. 40.
110. Id. 41.
111. Id. 44.
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opinion. 1 2 When he delivered it on July 10, 2003 he was re-
signed to the fact that:
[I] t clearly follows from the Court's judgment in Uni6n de Pe-
quefios Agricultores that the traditional interpretation of indi-
vidual concern, because it is understood to flow from the
Treaty itself, must be applied regardless of its consequences
for the right to an effective judicial remedy." 13
It came as no surprise therefore that the Court of Justice
later allowed the appeal of the Commission and set aside the
judgment of the Court of First Instance in Jggo-Qu6rd. "4 In par-
ticular, the Court of Justice reaffirmed strongly that the default
system for redress by private litigants was via the national courts.
The Court emphasized that "an action for annulment before
the Community Court should not on any view be available, even
where it is apparent that the national procedural rules do not
allow the individual to contest the validity of the Community
measure at issue unless he has first contravened it."1" 5 It added
that the Court of Justice could not remedy any defect in the na-
tional legal order which deprived private litigants of the right of
redress by granting standing to them under Article 230, Section
4: To do so would require the Court to review national proce-
dure and that would go beyond its jurisdiction when reviewing
the legality of Community measures." 6 It took up the theme
that it had relied on in its judgment in UPA once again that it is
for the Member States to establish a system of legal remedies and
procedures which ensure respect for the right of effective judi-
cial protection.
There is one idea put forward by the Court of Justice in its
judgment in UPA that was not repeated in its judgment in jggo-
Qugr. That idea concerned the possibility of a change being
made to the wording of Article 230, Section 4 itself. In its judg-
ment in UPA, the Court had added as a sort of coda:
While it is, admittedly possible to envisage a system ofjudicial
review of the legality of Community measures of general ap-
plication different from that established by the founding
112. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Commission v.Jdgo-Qur6 & Cie SA,
Case C-263/02, [2004] E.C.R. 1-3425.
113. Id. 45.
114. Commission v. Jdgo-Qudr6 & Cie SA, Case C-263/02, [2004] E.C.R. 1-3425.
115. Id. 34.
116. See id. 33.
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Treaty and never amended as to its principles, it is for the
Member States, if necessary, in accordance with Article 48
EU, to reform the system currently in force. 1 7
The Court of Justice made no such remark in its judgment of
July 10, 2003 in Jgo-Qur, because by that time as we shall see,
no sweeping change to the wording of Article 230, Section 4 was
going to be proposed by the Convention.
Some authors consider that the Court of Justice was cau-
tious not to change the rules on standing because of the discus-
sions taking place in the Convention with a view to the drafting
of a Constitution." 8 Such a motive for caution by the Court is
unlikely as the criticisms of the restrictive rules on standing were
well known and the Court was required to work within the con-
fines of the existing wording of Article 230, Section 4. Rather,
the reluctance to change the rules on standing indicates the
deep seated attachment of the Court of Justice to the existing
decentralized system in which the enforcement of the rights of
private litigants is to take place by default in the courts of the
Member States. After all, the Court itself through its President
had, by that time, made representations to the Convention Dis-
cussion Circle on the Court of Justice that were hardly an en-
couragement to change the system. 1 9 In any case, the terms of
the debate before the Court of Justice in both UPA and jggo-
Qur9 were not whether the rules on standing should be changed
but whether they could be changed within the existing wording
of Article 230, Section 4. Nor can Paragraph 45 of the judgment
in UPA be viewed as a pressing invitation to the Member States
to amend Article 230, Section 4. The Court of Justice has re-
ferred to the possibility that the Member States or EC Institu-
117. Uni6n de Pequefios Agricultores ("UPA") v. Council, Case C-50/00 P, [2002]
E.C.R. 1-6677, 45.
118. See, e.g., Ewa Biernat, The Locus Standi of Private Applicants under article 230(4)
EC and the Principle ofJudicial Protection in the European Community 43 (Jean Monnet Cent.
Int'l & Regional Econ. L. &Justice, NYU School of Law, Working Paper No. 12/03), at
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/papers03.html (last visited Apr. 15,
2007)- Dominik Hanf, Talking with the "Pouvoir Constituant" in Times of Constitutional
Reform: The European Court of Justice on Private Applicants' Access to Justice, EUR. LEGAL
STUD., Mar. 2003, at http://www.coleurop.be/content/studyprogrammes/law/study
prog/pdf/ResearchPapert7_3_2003_Hanf.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
119. See European Convention, Secretariat, Oral Presentation by M. Gil Carlos Rodri-
guez Iglesias, President of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, to the "Discussion
Circle" on the Court ofJustice on 17February 2003, CONV 572/03 (1) 3-5 (Mar. 10, 2003)
[hereinafter Iglesias Presentation].
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tions could amend provisions of Community law before, 121 and it
did so in a more neutral manner without remarking that an
amendment would entail a change of principles that had never
been amended.
The Court of Justice did not extend an invitation to the
Member States to change the wording of Article 230, Section 4
so that private litigants could seek redress in the Community
courts rather than in national courts. Nor was it an invitation
the Member States ever would have accepted.
C. Reforms: The Changes Made to the Treaty and the Constitution
One of the striking aspects of the whole controversy sur-
rounding the limited access of private litigants to the European
Courts is the little desire by the Member States to amend the
wording of Article 230, Section 4. The Court of Justice made
that very point in Paragraph 45 of its judgment in UPA when it
referred to the system of procedures as having been "never
amended."' 2 '
Over the years, the Member States have modified many
parts of the Treaty of Rome. Relatively few modifications have
been made to the section on the Court of Justice. The Single
European Act introduced a new Treaty article providing for the
creation of the Court of First Instance. 122
The pace of change accelerated with the Treaty of Nice. It
amended a number of provisions dealing with the Court of Jus-
tice. In fact, eight articles were modified by the Nice Treaty,12 3
and two new provisions were inserted.12 4
Of particular relevance is the fact that the Treaty of Nice
modified the second and third paragraphs of Article 230 to ele-
vate the European Parliament to the status of a fully privileged
120. See GIE Groupe Concorde v. The Master of the vessel "Suhadiwarno Panjan,"
Case C-440/97, [1999] E.C.R. 1-6307, J 21-22.
121. See Uni6n de Pequefios Agricultores ("UPA") v. Council, Case C-50/00 P,
[2002] E.C.R. 1-6677, 1 45.
122. Formerly Article 168, subsequently Article 225 of the EC Treaty, but before
modification by the Treaty of Nice.
123. See EC Treaty, supra note 5, arts. 220-25, 230(2)-(3), 245, O.J. C 321 E/37, at
141-44, 146, 150 (2006).
124. See id. arts. 225a, 229a, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 144, 146 (2006); see alsoJ-V Louis,
La FonctionJuridictionnelle: De Nice d Rome, in UNE CONSTITUTION POUR L'EUROIE: RtFLF.-
XIONS SUR LES TRANSFORMATIONS nU DROIT DE L'UNION EUROPtENNE 119-40 (Olivier de
Schutter & Paul Nihoul eds., 2004).
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applicant rather than a semi-privileged applicant.1 25 But no
change was made to Article 230, Section 4. Thus, the wording of
that particular provision has remained unaltered for half a cen-
tury.
Hopes were raised by the work of the Convention on the
Future of Europe ("Convention") that had the task of drafting
the Constitution. 26 Those hopes have been dashed because the
outcome did not result in a considerable improvement of the
standing of private litigants. The modesty of the outcome is all
the more significant when seen in the light of the number of
contributions and representations made signaling the difficulties
raised by the current wording of Article 230, Section 4 and urg-
ing that standing for private litigants be broadened. 121
Once again, the sequence of events is revelatory. It is possi-
ble to discern two phases in the work of the Convention. During
the first phase up to the formation of the "Discussion Circle" on
the Court ofJustice in early 2003, the Convention and in particu-
lar its Working Group II on the Charter and European Conven-
tion on Human Rights received many contributions on the issue
of standing. Most of those contributions recommended that Ar-
ticle 230, Section 4 be modified to grant private litigants broader
standing. For instance, on May 14, 2002, a member of the Con-
vention, Mr. Farnleitner, sent in a contribution on the need to
examine the wording of Article 230, Section 4 and suggested
that the condition of "individual concern" be deleted thus al-
lowing individuals to challenge acts that were of "direct" concern
to them. 128 Working Group II received an extensive note from
Advocate GeneralJacobs outlining the "Necessary changes to the
system of judicial remedies. '1 29 On November 14, 2002, Messrs.
125. Article 2, Section 42 of the Treaty of Amsterdam had already formalized the
status of the European Parliament as a semi-privileged applicant. See Treaty of Amster-
dam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European
Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C 340/1 (1997).
126. For details on the work of the Convention and the Discussion Circle in partic-
ular, see Marton Varju, The Debate on the Future of the Standing under Article 230(4) TEC in
the European Convention, 10 EUR. PUB. L. 43, 48-53 (2004).
127. See generally Cornelia Koch, Locus Standi of Private Applicants under the EU Con-
stitution: Preserving Gaps in the Protection of Individuals' Right to an Effective Remedy, 30 EUR.
L. REv. 511 (2005).
128. See European Convention, Secretariat, Hannes Farnleitner, Facilitating Individ-
ual Actions Before the European Court ofJustice and the Court of First Instance, CONV 45/02
25 (May 14, 2002) [hereinafter Contribution 25].
129. See European Convention, Working Group II, Francis G. Jacobs, Note for the
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Farnleitner and Rack made a clarification of a previous contribu-
tion,13 ° suggesting that only the condition of "direct concern"
remain in the requirement of standing. 13 1 Jiirgen Meyer, a
member of the Convention, suggested that the requirements of
being "directly and individually concerned" should be changed
to become alternative, not cumulative, conditions.1 32 Practically
the sole dissenter was Judge Skouris, when he was heard by
Working Group II on September 17, 2002 in his personal capac-
ity. He considered that the existing system of remedies com-
plied with the need to respect fundamental rights but did not
exclude the possibility of an amendment to Article 230, Section
4.133
The strong tendency of the different contributions there-
fore was to suggest amendments, some more sweeping than
others, to the wording of Article 230, Section 4 to broaden the
rules on standing. The Convention did not content itself with
those contributions, however.
Instead, it decided to form a "Discussion Circle on the
Court ofJustice" to hear a broader range of views of experts and
to hear those of the Court of Justice and of the Court of First
Instance."' The establishment of the Discussion Circle marks
the second phase in the work of the Convention. The Discus-
sion Circle was tasked to examine, among other topics, whether
the wording of Article 230, Section 4 on direct appeals by indi-
viduals against general acts of the Institutions should be
amended.13 5
As the Discussion Circle gathered a wider range of views in a
more systematic manner than that in which contributions were
Working Group on the Charter/ECHR: Necessary Changes to the System of Judicial Remedies,
WG II- WND 020 (Sept. 27, 2002) [hereinafter Working Document 20].
130. See Working Document 20, supra note 128.
131. See European Convention, Secretariat, Hannes Farnleitner & Reinhard Rack,
Extending the Right of Action for Individuals Before the European Court ofJustice and the Court
of First Instance, CONV 402/02 (Nov. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Contribution 141].
132. See European Convention, Secretariat, JOrgen Meyer, Enforceability of the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights and Improvement of the Individual's Right to Legal Redress, CONV
439/02 (Nov. 29, 2002) [hereinafter Contribution 160].
133. See European Convention, Working Group II, Judge Vassilios Skouris, Speak-
ingNote: Hearing of 17 September 2002, WG I1-I-D 019 (Sept. 27, 2002), at 4-5 [hereinaf-
ter Working Document 19].
134. See European Convention, Secretariat, "Discussion Circle" on the Court ofjustice:
Framework of Proceedings, CONV 543/03 (Feb. 7, 2003).
135. Id. at 2.
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presented to the Working Group of the Convention, a more
nuanced, complex picture began to emerge.
President Rodriguez Iglesias, then-President of the Court of
Justice, made a presentation to the Discussion Circle on Febru-
ary 17, 2003.136 He pointed out that the current system of ac-
tions and remedies for private litigants was based on the princi-
ple of "subsidiarity" in which the courts of the Member States
were primarily responsible for protecting the rights of individu-
als. 137 He conceded that certain amendments could be made to
Article 230, Section 4 to improve the protection of individuals at
the EC level. But to do so, he emphasized, would involve a
change in policy because in the past the policy was that actions
brought by individuals should not be brought before the Court
of Justice but before national courts.'38
President Vesterdorf presented his views to the Discussion
Circle on February 24, 2003.13' He too presented a nuanced
view. A change in wording of Article 230, Section 4 to broaden
the rules on standing meant a change in policy. He candidly
admitted that the members of the Court of First Instance were
divided on the issue of an amendment to Article 230, Section 4:
Some members considered that the existing system was adequate
while others disagreed. 4 " If a change were to be made, he ex-
pressed the hope that a distinction would be made between leg-
islative and regulatory measures. He suggested that individuals
be permitted to challenge "regulatory measures," while the cur-
rent restrictions on standing for private plaintiffs be carried over
to actions against "legislative measures." '141
Clearly the idea emerged that a change to the rules on
standing would entail a shift in policy and would change the
center of gravity of the relationship between the EC Courts and
the courts of the Member States. The magnitude of that shift
had an impact.
It rapidly became clear that the Discussion Circle was di-
136. See Iglesias Presentation, supra note 119.
137. Id. at 3.
138. See id. at 3-4.
139. See European Convention, Secretariat, Oral Presentation by M. Bo Vesterdorf Pres-
ident of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, to the Discussion Circle on the
Court of Justice on 24 February 2003, CONV 575/03 (1) (Mar. 10, 2003).
140. See id. at 4.
141. Id. at 5.
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vided into two groups. For the first group, no change to the
wording of Article 230, Section 4 was required. 4 2 That first
group considered that the existing system was adequate and reli-
ance could be placed on national courts in a decentralized sys-
tem to defend the rights of individuals. The national courts
could (or should, if at last instance) refer questions to the Court
of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the validity of a Union act.
Those members did suggest however that the Constitution
should:
mention explicitly that, in accordance with the principle of
loyal cooperation as interpreted by the Court of Justice, na-
tional courts are required to interpret and apply national pro-
cedural rules governing the exercise of rights of action in a
way that enables natural and legal persons to challenge
before the courts the legality of any decision or other na-
tional measure relative to the application to them of a Com-
munity act of general application, by pleading the invalidity
of such an act. It is in fact for the Member States to establish
a system of legal remedies and procedures which ensures re-
spect for the right of individuals to effective judicial protec-
tion as regards rights resulting from Union law.'
4 3
According to the second group, on the other hand, the
rules on standing for proceedings by individuals against mea-
sures of general application were too restrictive. 144 That group
did not appear to agree on a single, satisfactory amendment. In-
stead, its members came up with the following solutions:
(a) separate the two conditions [of individual and direct con-
cern,] which would no longer be cumulative;
(b) replace "and individual" by "and affects his legal situa-
tion;"
(c) maintain the current wording and add "or against a mea-
sure of general application which is of direct concern to him
without entailing any implementing measure;"
(d) leave the current wording for legislative acts (henceforth
laws and framework laws) and allow referral to the Court of
Justice for regulatory acts; these could be the subject of pro-
142. See European Convention, Chairman of the Discussion Circle on the Court of
Justice, Final Report of the Discussion Circle on the Court ofJustice, CONV 636/03, CERCLE I
13 (Mar. 25, 2003).
143. Id. at 6.
144. See id. at 7.
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ceedings where they are of direct or individual concern to an
individual;
(e) same as above, but giving individuals the right to bring
proceedings against legislative acts of the Union which do not
entail any implementing measure.
145
The introduction of a specific right to bring proceedings for the
defence of fundamental rights was proposed by some members.
A majority of members of the second group were in favor of re-
drafting Article 230, Section 4 as follows:
Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions,
institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person
or which is of direct and individual concern to him, and
against [an act of general application] [a regulatory act]
which is of direct concern to him without entailing imple-
menting measures.
14 6
The additional words "without entailing implementing mea-
sures" seek to ensure that the extension of a private individual's
right to institute proceedings would apply only to cases where
the individual concerned must first infringe the law before he
can have access to a court.
The draft forwarded to the Convention contained the
amendment suggested by the majority of the second group who
were in favor of a change to the wording of Article 230, Section
4. 147 The only change was the use of the term "regulatory act"
instead of "act of general application." It was also suggested to
the Convention that the Constitution should include a new Arti-
cle 20, Section 1 on the Court of Justice reading: "Member
States shall provide rights of appeal sufficient to ensure effective
legal protection in the field of Union law."' 148
In the end, the Constitution included the following provi-
sion in Article 111-365:
4. Any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid
down in paragraphs 1 and 2, institute proceedings against an
act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individ-
ual concern to him or her, and against a regulatory act which
145. Id. at 7.
146. Id.
147. See European Convention, Praesidium, Articles on the Court of Justice and the
High Court, CONV 734/03 (May 12, 2003) [hereinafter Draft Articles].
148. Id. at 5; see also European Convention, The Praesidium, Institutions-Draft Ar-
ticles for Title IV of Part I of the Constitution, CONV 691/03 (Apr. 23, 2003).
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is of direct concern to him or her and does not entail imple-
menting measures. 14 9
That wording is of course the same as that suggested by the Dis-
cussion Circle. It is not the significant broadening of the scope
of standing of private litigants that many had hoped for. 50
Article 111-365 and in particular its Section 4 has four salient
features. First it reintroduced the distinction originally made in
the EC Treaty between constitutional type litigation and admin-
istrative actions by individuals. The Constitution sought, in its
Article 1-33, to introduce a new taxonomy of acts that could be
adopted. Article 1-33 provided for "legislative acts" comprising
"European laws" of general application and "European frame-
work laws" binding as to the result to be achieved. 15 1 It also pro-
vided for non-legislative acts comprising "European regulations"
which implement legislative acts and certain provisions of the
Constitution and "European decisions," as well as non-binding
measures such as "recommendations" and "opinions." 52 The re-
sult of Article 111-365, Section 4 was to leave unchanged the posi-
tion of private litigants seeking annulment of legislative acts:
They must still show that the measure is of direct and individual
concern to them.
The second feature is that Article 111-365, Section 4 intro-
duced a new category of act-a "regulatory act"-which is not de-
fined in Article 1-33 of the Constitution. 153 When seeking annul-
ment of such a "regulatory act," the private applicant need only
show that it is of direct concern to her and does not entail imple-
menting measures. 154 According to the comment included in
Document CONV 734/03, dated May 12, 2003, the term "regula-
tory act" was used:
since it would enable a distinction to be made between legis-
lative acts and regulatory acts, maintaining a restrictive ap-
proach in relation to actions by individuals against legislative
acts (for which the "of direct and individual concern" condi-
tion remains applicable) while providing for a more open ap-
149. Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, O.J. C
310/1, at 159-60 (2004) (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Draft Treaty].
150. See Koch, supra note 127, at 527.
151. Draft Treaty, supra note 149, art. 1-33, O.J. C 310/1, at 26-27 (2004).
152. Id.
153. Id. art. 111-365, § 4, O.J. C 310/1, at 160 (2004).
154. Id.
2007] 1531
1532 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 30:1496
proach to actions against regulatory acts."5
5
That would seem to indicate that "regulatory acts" are a broader
category of generally applicable acts than "European regula-
tions" as defined in Article 1-33, Section 1, fourth subparagraph
and could comprise "European decisions" as defined in Article I-
33, Section 1, fifth subparagraph, if they do not have any particu-
lar addressee and thus apply generally. If that is so, a European
decision addressed to a particular addressee would not be a "reg-
ulatory act" but an individual one for its addressee. Conse-
quently, if a private litigant who is not the addressee sought to
annul that European decision, she would have to show that it was
an act of direct and individual concern to her.156
The third feature of Article 111-365, Section 4 is that it
broadens the rule on standing for an action against a regulatory
act that "does not entail implementing measures." Such a
change would seem, at first glance, to incorporate what the
Court of First Instance had held in its judgment in Jjgo-Qur. 157
But it does not. It is more restrictive than the rule adumbrated
by the Court of First Instance because it applies only to "regula-
tory acts" to the exclusion of legislative acts, such as European
laws and European framework laws. The ruling of the Court of
First Instance in Jdgo-Qudri applied to both legislative and imple-
menting measures. Thus a private litigant seeking the annul-
ment of a European law, which does not entail any implement-
ing measure, would have to show that she is directly and individ-
ually concerned under Article 111-365, Section 4 of the
Constitution whereas according to the judgment in Jgo-Qu6rg, if
she were seeking the annulment of a regulation, she would only
have to show she was directly concerned by the regulation.
The fourth salient feature is that Article 111-365, Section 4
sought to preserve the traditional, decentralized system of the
protection of the rights of private parties in which the default
procedure is that of an action before a national court. That
characteristic of Article 111-365, Section 4 is more manifest when
it is juxtaposed with Article 1-29, Section 1, second subpara-
155. Draft Articles, supra note 147, at 20.
156. See Koen Lenaerts & Ignace Maselis, Le SystfneJuridictionnel de l'Union, in COM-
MENTAIRE DE LA CONSTITUTION DE L'UNION EUROP9ENNE 231 (Marianne Dony & Em-
manuelle Bribosia eds., 2005).
157. J~go-Qu~r6 & Cie SA v. Commission, Case T-177/01, [2002] E.C.R. 11-2365.
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graph, which provided "Member States shall provide remedies
sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the field covered
by Union law."' 58 Further evidence that enforcement through
the national courts together with the possibility of referring a
preliminary question to the Court of Justice remains the default
system for enforcement of private rights is provided by the word-
ing of Article III-369.15' That provision, like Article 234, confers
jurisdiction on the Court of Justice to rule on the validity of all
types of acts, without restriction.
The drafters of the Constitution were attached to the decen-
tralized system of enforcement as the default procedure for pro-
tecting the rights of private litigants because they considered the
system to be robust and effective. And the Court of Justice has
made it more so.
III. THE INDIRECT ROUTE STRIKES BACK
A. The Court of Justice Reinforces It
A number of commentators consider that the Court of Jus-
tice failed to take the opportunity in UPA to improve the posi-
tion of private plaintiffs.16 ° Recently, in this Journal, Laurence
Gormley wrote: "The present state of judicial review in relation
to the fourth paragraph of Article 230 of the EC Treaty is still
fundamentally unsatisfactory."''
As the outcome of the work on the Constitution shows, a
substantial reform of Article 230, Section 4 in the near future is
unlikely. Yet, the Constitution itself points to the direction that
future modifications may take. Article 1-29, Section 1 of the Con-
stitution states clearly that it is for the Member States to ensure
that private plaintiffs can seek redress.
The terms of Article 1-29, Section 1, second subparagraph of
158. Draft Treaty, supra note 149, art. 1-29, § 1, O.J. C 310/1, at 24 (2004).
159. Id. art. 111-369, O.J. C 310/1, at 161 (2004).
160. See, e.g., Marie-Pierre Granger, Towards a Liberalisation of Standing Conditions
for Individuals Seeking Judicial Review of Community Acts: Jhgo-Quhre et Cie v Commission
and Uni6n de Pequefhos Agricultores v Council, 66 MoD. L. REV. 124 (2003); Albertina
Albors-Llorens, The Standing of Private Parties to Challenge Community Measures: Has the
European Court Missed the Boat?, 62 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 72 (2003); Filip Ragolle, Access to
Justice for Private Applicants in the Community Legal Order: Recent (R)evolutions, 28 EUR. L.
REV. 90, 101 (2003).
161. Laurence W. Gormley, Judicial Review: Advice for the Deaf 29 FORDHAM INTr'L
LJ. 655, 687 (2006).
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the Constitution recall a passage couched in similar terms in the
judgments of the Court of Justice in UPA and Jggo-Qujrd. The
Court stated:
[I] t is for the Member States to establish a system of legal
remedies and procedures which ensure respect for the right
to effective judicial protection.
In that context, in accordance with the principle of sincere
cooperation laid down in Article 10 EC, national courts are
required, so far as possible, to interpret and apply national
procedural rules governing the exercise of rights of action in
a way that enables natural and legal persons to challenge
before the courts the legality of any decision or other na-
tional measure relative to the application to them of a Com-
munity act of general application, by pleading the invalidity
of such an act.
162
The Court of Justice then gave the idea greater impact in its
judgment in R v. Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British Ameri-
can Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco Ltd. 6 It reinforced
the idea that the review of the validity of Community acts in the
national courts is the default system and firmly rejected any no-
tion that that procedure could be used as a means to circumvent
the restrictive rules on standing for private litigants in Article
230, Section 4.
In this case, two British tobacco companies, British Ameri-
can Tobacco (Investments) Ltd. and Imperial Tobacco Ltd.,
sought permission to apply for judicial review of the intention
and/or obligation of the United Kingdom Government to trans-
pose Directive 2001/37/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of June 5, 2001 on the approximation of the laws,
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States
concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco
products. 64 They sought judicial review in the English High
Court on September 3, 2001, over a year before the United King-
dom was under an obligation to bring Directive 2001/37/EC
into force by September 30, 2002 in accordance with its Article
14, Section 1. They alleged that Directive 2001/37/EC was inva-
162. Uni6n de Pequefios Agricultores ("UPA") v. Council, Case C-50/00 P, [2002]
E.C.R. 1-6677, 41-42.
163. R. v. Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Invest-
ments) and Imperial Tobacco Ltd., Case C-491/01, [2002] E.C.R. I-11453.
164. See Council Directive No. 2001/37/EC, O.J. L 194/1, at 26 (2001).
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lid. 16 5 The English High Court then referred the matter of the
validity of Directive 2001/37/EC to the Court ofJustice pursuant
to Article 234.
The French Government and the Commission intervened
before the Court of Justice and submitted that the preliminary
reference was inadmissible.' 66 They claimed that it should not
be possible for the issue of the validity of directives to be raised
before the time-limit set for implementation expired and before
national legislation transposing Directive 2001/37/EC in the
United Kingdom had yet been adopted. They pointed out that a
directive can be relied on by individuals before national courts
only after the expiry of the time-limit laid down for its transposi-
tion into national law and that its provisions cannot before that
date create rights for individuals which the national courts must
protect.
1 1
7
Consequently, they submitted that the dispute was not ripe
for resolution by the Court of Justice. Even more significantly,
the French Government and the Commission submitted that to
permit an individual to challenge the validity of a directive
before a national court before the expiry of the period pre-
scribed for its implementation and when no measures have been
adopted to transpose it into national law could constitute a
means of circumventing Article 230, which would be contrary to
the system of legal remedies established by the Treaty. 6 '
The Court of Justice roundly rejected both arguments. It
dealt first with the issue of ripeness of the reference to the Court
of Justice. It reaffirmed the principle that it is for the referring,
national court to decide whether it is necessary to obtain a ruling
from the Court of Justice on the validity of a Community act and
when it does so the Court of Justice must in principle give the
ruling requested.169 The Court found that in this particular case
the ruling on the validity of Directive 2001/37/EC could have an
influence both on the need to transpose it into English law and
165. See British American Tobacco, [2002] E.C.R. 1-11453, 9 1.
166. See Nicole Vaneetveld v. Le Foyer SA & Le Foyer SA v. Federation de Mutuali-
ties Socialistes et Syndicales de la Province de Liege, Case C-316/93, [1994] E.C.R. I-
763.
167. Id. 16, 19.
168. See British American Tobacco, [2002] E.C.R. 1-11453, 1 31.
169. Id. 34; see also Eurotunnel SA v. SeaFrance, Case C-408/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-
6315, 1 19.
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on the proceedings before the High Court.' v
Next, the Court dealt with the argument on the circumven-
tion of Article 230. The Court ofJustice responded in a way that
resolutely reinforces the idea that actions in the national courts
and references from them on the validity of Community acts
pursuant to Article 234 is the default system that private plain-
tiffs should use. The Court held:
As for the argument that to accept the admissibility of the
order for reference seeking a decision on validity in a situa-
tion such as that in the main proceedings could be tanta-
mount to circumventing the requirements of Article 230 EC,
it must be stated that, in the complete system of legal reme-
dies and procedures established by the EC Treaty with a view
to ensuring judicial review of the legality of acts of the institu-
tions, where natural or legal persons cannot, by reason of the
conditions for admissibility laid down in the fourth paragraph
of that article, directly challenge Community measures of
general application, they are able, depending on the case, ei-
ther indirectly to plead the invalidity of such acts before the
Community judicature under Article 241 EC or to do so
before the national courts and ask them, since they have no
jurisdiction themselves to declare those measures invalid, to
make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary
ruling on validity. 71
Significantly, the Court of Justice added that the right of private
litigants to claim that Community acts are invalid is not subject,
as a matter of EC law, to any form of ripeness 172 test before those
courts:
The opportunity open to individuals to plead the invalidity of
a Community act of general application before national
courts is not conditional upon that act's actually having been
the subject of implementing measures adopted pursuant to
national law. In that respect, it is sufficient if the national
court is called upon to hear a genuine dispute in which the
question of the validity of such an act is raised indirectly.
That condition is amply fulfilled in the circumstances of the
170. British American Tobacco, [2002] E.C.R. 1-11453, 36-37.
171. Id. 39 (citing Uni6n de Pequefios Agricultores v. Council, Case C-50/00,
[2002] E.C.R. 1-6677, 1 40).
172. "Ripeness" is not a term of art used in EC law. It is used in this Article in the
sense in which it is used by the U.S. Supreme Court in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 136, 149 (1967) (explaining ripeness as "fitness of the issues forjudicial decision").
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case in the main proceedings. 173
What are the implications of that passage exactly? One com-
mentator claims that the Court of Justice seeks to oblige the
Member States to amend their procedures so that private liti-
gants can challenge national measures pre-emptively if that is
necessary to allow them to question the validity of generally ap-
plicable Community acts by means of the preliminary reference
procedure.' 74 That interpretation is seductive. There would
seem no particular reason why the Court of Justice would have
included that passage in its judgment otherwise. The pre-emp-
tive challenge was permitted as a matter of English law by the
High Court in the form of declaratory relief so there was no
need to examine whether it should be permitted. And the Court
of Justice had already held in the previous paragraphs of the
judgment that the preliminary reference was admissible in the
circumstances of the case. There was no necessity for the Court
of Justice to examine how the issue of ripeness should be dealt
with by the national court.
If that is the correct interpretation of paragraph 40 of the
judgment in British American Tobacco, then the Court of Justice
will have dealt, albeit implicitly, with the problem faced by the
plaintiffs identified by the Court of First Instance in paragraph
45 of its judgment in Jggo-Qur6: The absence of "acts of imple-
mentation capable of forming the basis of an action before na-
tional courts," which meant that she would have to violate the
rules imposed by the EC before being able to assert their illegal-
ity in subsequent national proceedings.'7 5
Others, on the other hand, do not consider that it was the
intention of the Court to go so far.'76 They submit that if it were
interpreted in that manner, the Court would be contradicting its
statements in the judgments in UPA and Jrgo-Qu6dr, in which it
did not declare unacceptable national procedural rules which
have the result of obliging a private plaintiff to wait until she has
173. British American Tobacco, [2002] E.C.R. 1-11453, 40.
174. See Paul Nihoul, Le Recours des Particuliers Contres les Actes Communautaires de
Portge GCnMrale. Nouveaux Dgveloppements dans la Jurisprudence, JOURN. DES TRIBUNAUX
DROIT EUROPEEN 38, 43 (2003).
175. Jbgo-Qur6 & Cie SA v. Commission, Case T-177/01, [2002] E.C.R. 11-2365,
45.
176. See, e.g., Lenaerts & Maselis, supra note 156, at 234 n.87.
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infringed the law before challenging it.' 7 7 The difficulty
presented with this view is that the Court of Justice never ex-
pressly condoned a national system of remedies in which the pri-
vate plaintiff would have to breach the rule of Community law
first before being able to challenge it. What the Court of Justice
held was that such a circumstance was insufficient of itself tojus-
tify a change in the interpretation of Article 230, Section 4. The
Court of Justice in both UPA and Jigo-Qutrg emphasized that the
onus was on the Member States to establish an adequate system
of remedies and procedures that ensure effective judicial protec-
tion. 17
8
Even if the Court ofJustice had considered acceptable a sys-
tem in which a private plaintiff had first to breach a rule of law
before being able to challenge it, that system would no longer
comply with the requirements of Article 6, Section 1 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights.' 79 The European Court of
Human Rights had specifically considered that possibility in the
case of Posti and Rahko v. Finland and held in Paragraph 64 of its
judgment that:
Finally, in so far as it might be argued that the applicants
could have obtained access to a court by violating the 1996
and the 1998 Decrees and awaiting prosecution, the Court
considers that no one can be required to breach the law so as
to be able to have a "civil right" determined in accordance
with Article 6 § 1.180
It is possible that the Court of Justice added paragraph 40 to its
judgment in British American Tobacco, in order to take account of
that passage in the judgment of the European Court of Human
Rights in Posti and Rahko. Once again, the chronology of events
is significant. The European Court of Human Rights handed
down its judgment on September 24, 2002, and the Court ofJus-
tice handed down its judgment on December 10, 2002. If in-
deed the Court of Justice wanted to take account of the evolving
standard of access of private plaintiffs to judicial redress, itsjudg-
177. Uni6n de Pequefios Agricultores ("UPA") v. Council, Case C-50/00 P, [2002]
E.C.R. 1-6677; see Commission v.Jego-Qu6r6 & Cie SA, Case G-263/02, [2004] E.C.R. 1-
3425.
178. UPA, [2002] E.C.R. 1-6677, 41;Jggo-Qugr6, [2004] E.C.R. 1-3425, 31.
179. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 7, art. 6, § 1.
180. Posti & Rahko v. Finland, 27824 Eur. Ct. H.R. 95, 66 (2002). The relevant
decrees in this case were Finnish decrees limiting the fishing rights the Applicants had
from leases conferring fishing rights.
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ment in British American Tobacco could be seen as a signal to the
Member States that they too should beware that their systems
and procedures could come under scrutiny as a matter of EC
law.
Moreover, in a recent and significant judgment in Unibet
(London) Ltd. and Unibet (International) Ltd. v. Justitiekanslern, the
Court of Justice indicated that if no procedure or legal remedy
existed in the national legal order at all, rendering it impossible
for an individual to ensure respect for her rights under EC law,
then the principle of effective judicial protection would require
the creation of a procedure or remedy for that purpose.' 8 That
case dealt with the question of whether a remedy provided
under Swedish law-permitting an individual to challenge a na-
tional measure alleged to be incompatible with EC law by an in-
direct route only-actually provided effective judicial protection.
It did not therefore expressly deal with the issue of an individual
having to breach the law first before having the right to chal-
lenge it.
Nevertheless, the Court of Justice made broad statements of
principle according to which Member States must establish a sys-
tem of legal remedies to ensure effective judicial protection and
that national law does not undermine that protection. 182 As a
result, it is permitted to conclude that the Court of Justice would
likely take the view that the impossibility of challenging a mea-
sure without breaching it first would not be conducive to ensur-
ing effective judicial protection.
In the light of those developments, the amendment of the
national procedures to permit pre-emptive judicial review would
be one step in dealing with the gap identified in the system of
judicial protection afforded by Community law.
B. National Courts Take the Indirect Route Seriously
National courts too can make and indeed have made the
indirect route more effective. The French Conseil d'Etat re-
cently handed down a significant judgment on February 8, 2007
181. Unibet (London) Ltd. & Unibet (Int'l) Ltd. v. Justitiekanslern, Case C-432/
05, 41 (ECJ Mar. 13, 2007) (not yet reported).
182. Id. 42.
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in the Arcelor case. 8 ' Thatjudgment shows that national courts
can change their practice in order to ensure rights and obliga-
tions that flow ultimately from EC law are enforced in a manner
respectful of individual rights. In this case, Arcelor and the
other plaintiffs requested the French President, the Prime Minis-
ter and other competent ministers repeal the decree number
2004-832 of August 19, 2004.184 That decree was adopted by the
French Government in order to implement Directive 2003/87/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 Octo-
ber 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission al-
lowance trading within the Community and amending Council
Directive 96/61/EC. 185 Directive 2003/87/EC was adopted in
turn in order to implement the Kyoto Protocol. When they re-
ceived no response to their request for repeal, they brought an
action before the Conseil d'Etat to annul the implicit rejection
of their request. They alleged that decree number 2004-832 was
illegal because it applied to steel producers and infringed the
principles of the right to property and to trade freely and the
principle of equality guaranteed by the French Constitution.18 6
In its judgment, the Conseil d'Etat noted that decree num-
ber 2004-832 applied to steel producers because Directive 2003/
87/EC required that it should. 8 7 Thus, if it declared decree
number 2004-832 to be unconstitutional, it would in effect be
declaring invalid a measure adopted by an EC institution. But it
did not have jurisdiction to do that. Consequently, the Conseil
d'Etat looked to see if EC law contains principles that protected
the applicant steel producers in a manner equivalent to that of
the French Constitution. It found that the right to property and
to trade freely as well as the principle of non-discrimination were
general principles upheld by EC law in the same way as they were
protected by the French Constitution.'88 Therefore, in order to
give full effect to the supremacy of EC law, the Conseil d'Etat
183. Societe Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine, No. 287110 (Conseil d'Etat, Feb. 8,
2007) (not yet reported).
184. See Decret No. 2004-832 du 19 Aofit 2004 pris pour lApplication des Articles L. 229-
5 d L. 229-19 du Code de l'Environnement et Relatifau Systhne d'Echange de Quotas d'mission
de Gaz d Effet de Serre, 194 J.O. RI1PUBLIQUE FRANCAISE 14979 (Aug. 21, 2004).
185. Council Directive No. 2003/87/EC, O.J. L 275/32 (2003).
186. See 1958 CONST. pmbl., available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/
textes/constit.htm.
187. Set Arcelor, No. 287110.
188. Id.
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decided to refer a question to the Court of Justice under Article
234 on the validity of Directive 2003/87/EC."'8
The Conseil d'Etat issued a press release that explains the
importance of this judgment and how it marks a significant de-
parture from its previous practice:1 90 Previously, it would simply
have ruled on the constitutionality of the French decree without
examining whether the decree was a measure implementing a
superior rule of EC law.
An interesting aspect of this case is that Arcelor had
brought an action before the Court of First Instance under Arti-
cle 230, Section 4 to annul Directive 2003/87/EC on January 15,
2004.'9'
C. The Hidden Strength of the Indirect Route
That litigation before the French Conseil d'Etat also high-
lights another significant advantage of the indirect route of chal-
lenging the validity of Community acts via the national courts. If
Arcelor were successful in its direct action for annulment and
the Court of First Instance were to annul Directive 2003/87/EC,
the French decree of implementation would still be in force in
the French legal order and applicable to Arcelor. In practical
terms therefore, a victory in the Court of First Instance would
not result in Arcelor being freed automatically from the obliga-
tions that Decree No. 2004-832 imposed on it. It is arguable that
the French authorities would be under an obligation to repeal
the decree as a consequence of their obligation to cooperate sin-
cerely with the Community Institutions under Article 10 of the
EC Treaty. The French authorities could decide, however, that
they wish to maintain the decree in force under their own, au-
tonomous powers. Moreover, in the environmental field, as a
matter of EC law, the Member States are entitled to adopt or
maintain measures that provide for more stringent protection of
the environment than that provided by EC law.'92 Arcelor would
then still need to commence proceedings before the French
courts in order to challenge Decree No. 2004-832.
189. See Case C-127/07, O.J. C 117, at 8 (2007) (case pending).
190. See Press Release, Conseil d'Etat (Feb. 8, 2007), http://www.conseil-etat.fr/
ce/actual/indexac_lc0704.shtml (last visited Apr. 18, 2007).
191. See Arcelor v. European Parliament and Council, Case T-16/04, OJ. C 71, at
36 (filedJan. 15, 2004).
192. See EC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 176, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 125 (2006).
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The indirect challenge to the validity of Community acts via
the national courts has the advantage of concentrating the litiga-
tion in one forum. It allows the national court seized to refer a
question on the validity of the Community measure under Arti-
cle 234 and to draw all the necessary practical consequences in
domestic law should the Court of Justice decide the Community
act is invalid. The indirect route thus obviates the need to com-
mence separate and parallel proceedings in two different courts.
Another major advantage of the challenge to the validity of
Community acts through the preliminary reference procedure is
that the issue of validity can be raised at any time and is not
subject to any limitation period. Direct actions for annulment,
on the other hand, must be brought within two months. 19 3 The
absence of a limitation period renders the indirect route more
conducive to the protection of individuals in many practical cir-
cumstances than a direct action for annulment. One of the in-
triguing aspects on the debate on the broadening of rules on
standing for private plaintiffs under Article 230, Section 4 is that
there is apparently no criticism of that short limitation period. If
access to justice is a right that is so fundamental, the question
must be posed whether the imposition of such a limitation pe-
riod is an undue restriction of the exercise of that right. In
many cases, the requirement of bringing an application to annul
a measure within two months can constitute an insurmountable
barrier to challenging that act. That point is neatly illustrated by
the joined cases, Thomson Multimedia and Vestel France v. Adminis-
tration des Douanes et Droits Indirects.'9 4 In those cases, importers
of television sets into France challenged the validity in a French
court of an annex to a Commission Regulation,' 95 setting out
how the origin of television sets should be defined for the pur-
poses of determining the proper rate of customs duties applica-
ble to them. The Regulation in question was published on No-
vember 10, 1993 and entered into force on January 1, 1994. The
French court seized of the litigation referred a question to the
193. Id. art. 230, § 5, OJ. C 321 E/37, at 146 (2006).
194. Thomson Multimedia and Vestel France v. Administration des Douanes et
Droits Indirects, Joined Cases C-447-448/05 (ECJ Mar. 8, 2007) (not yet reported).
195. Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2454/93, O.J. L 253/1 (1993) (laying
down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2913/92,
establishing the Community Customs Code).
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Court of Justice on December 16, 2005 on the validity of the
applicable annex to the Commission Regulation.
It is highly unlikely that the importers in this case, or any
other importer of television sets for that matter, could realisti-
cally have mounted a direct action for annulment against the
relevant provision of the Commission Regulation within two
months of its publication. No trader could have genuinely fore-
seen the practical consequences of that provision of the Com-
mission Regulation and how it would affect its commercial be-
havior with sufficient clarity to decide whether an action for an-
nulment would be a viable strategy. As a matter of fact, the
plaintiffs in the main French proceedings in Thomson Multimedia
did not actually import television sets until some years after the
Commission Regulation had entered into force. Had those im-
porters been able to annul the Commission Regulation under
more generous standing rules, they would then have been
barred from questioning its validity in the national courts.1 9 6
The practical consequence of a more generous standing rule
without amendment of the limitation period would therefore be
to bar an examination of the validity of the measure forever.
A pre-emptive annulment action against the Commission
Regulation runs the risk, if successful, of ridding the legal order
of a measure before the full consequences of the measure have
been felt and evaluated by traders.
CONCLUSION
Many recognize that the European Community has become
more transparent and accountable. The fact that it remains rela-
tively exceptional for a private plaintiff to succeed in the quest
for standing to annul a generally applicable measure is still, to
some, a cause for lamentations.1 97 Nevertheless, the European
Court of Human Rights has held in its judgment of June 30,
2005 in the case of Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turzim ve Tikaret
Anonim Sikreti v. Ireland, that the system according to which indi-
viduals exercise a remedy through the national courts is one
which prima facie provides equivalent protection to individuals
to that provided by the European Convention on Human Rights
196. See TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
Case C-188/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-833.
197. See, e.g., Arnull, supra note 6, at 189.
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itself. 198
Whether the sum total of the procedures provided for by
national law and those provided for in the EC Treaty provide
effective judicial protection is a matter of opinion and judge-
ment. And that is not the issue addressed here. The subject of
this inquiry is where the defect, if there is any, should be re-
paired. Those who propose changing the rule on standing of
private plaintiffs would prefer to see actions brought before the
EC courts as the default system in which private plaintiffs can
seek protection of their rights.
A switch in the role of the EC courts as the principal or
default forum in which private plaintiffs can bring all their ac-
tions for annulment may well set in motion another deep rooted
and fundamental change in the relationship between EC law
and the laws of the Member States. As the Court of Justice held
very early on in Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, "the EEC Treaty has cre-
ated its own legal system which .. .became an integral part of
the legal systems of the Member States and which their courts
are bound to apply."' 9 9 What the Court meant was that the crea-
tion of EC law did not entail the creation of a new and discrete
system for the enforcement of rights and obligations. Instead it
created a body of law to constrain the Member States and which
was to be enforced through their existing judicial apparatus.2"'
The transfer of actions from the national courts to the EC courts
could result in moves to disjoin EC law from the legal systems of
the Member States. Whether such a transfer is made in the
name of constitutionalism, 2° 1 or to make up for some demo-
cratic deficit,2° 2 the result would be a fundamental change in the
character of EC law.
198. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turzim ve Tikaret Anonim Sikreti v. Ireland, 45036
Eur. Ct. H.R. 98, 1 164-165 (2005).
199. Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585, at 593.
200. The Court in Costa went on to describe that the Member States had limited
their sovereign rights by creating the EC. Id.
201. See generally Koen Lenaerts & Tim Corthaut, Judicial Review as a Contribution to
the Development of European Constitutionalism, 22 Y.B. EUR. L. 1 (2003).
202. See generally Luigi Malferrari, The Functional Representation of the Individual's In-
terests Before the EC Courts: The Evolution of the Remedies System and the Pluralistic deficit in the
EC, IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 667 (2005).
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